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The paper analyzes the government budget cost of credit guarantees and subsidies. The 
analysis is done both in a general qualitative manner and quantitatively for the case of Czech 
Supporting and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund (SGAFF). In the quantitative part 
of the paper we show that the portfolio of the SGAFF has a sufficient value to cover expected 
costs of credit guarantees and subsidies provided by the SGAFF. The qualitative theoretical 
model is dealing with government interventions designed to decrease the credit rationing of 
good farmers. The theoretical model shows that with uniform non-targeted supports the 
budget cost minimizing government unambiguously prefers lump-sum guarantees to interest 
rate subsidies. With supports targeted fully to disadvantaged farmers the government is 
indifferent between lump-sum guarantees, proportional guarantees and interest rates subsidies 
as far as the government budget costs are concerned. 
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The government support of agriculture is currently one of the most discussed areas of
economic polices of European Union (EU) and its member countries. Majority of the EU
interventions and regulations of agriculture is carried in the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP)framework. But in addition to CAP programs there exist also a National Aid pro-
grams in EU member countries. One of the most important National Aid programs in the
Czech agriculture is the support of commercially provided agricultural loans. This support
is administered by the special fund called the Supporting and Guarantee Agricultural and
Forestry Fund (SGAFF). In Czech it is known under the acronym PGRLF, which stands
for Podpurny a garancni rolnicky a lesnicky fond.
In this paper we ﬁrst brieﬂy describe the operations of this SGAFF fund and then
we concentrate on the question of its funding and its budgetary costs. Subsequently we
complement this quantitative analysis by a theoretical qualitative analysis of the budget
cost of diﬀerent government programs of agricultural credit support.
The problem of agricultural credit support is addressed by a number of papers in
both academic and policy oriented literature. Comprehensive overview of credit policies
is provided by Barry (1995). He analyzes public credit programs in the U.S. agriculture
both from the empirical and the theoretical point of view. The credit provision in the
U.S. agriculture is also discussed by Doucha (1993). The credit guarantees are further
described by Navajas (2001), who discusses credit guarantee schemes used by farmers or
small enterprises and by Gudger (1998), who concentrates on the use of credit guarantees
in agriculture. In the context of the Czech Republic, the activities of SGAFF during ﬁrst
few year of its operations were empirically investigated by Janda, Sklenkova, and Vigner
(1997).
The theoretical qualitative model in this paper is written in the tradition of asymmetric
information approach to the explanation of the credit market imperfections. This approach
3Table 1: Applications and Mediated Loans
Year Number of Of those Approval Volume of loans
applications approved ratio mediated
(CZK million)
1994 2605 2388 0.92 6235
1995 2945 2739 0.93 10129
1996 3426 3252 0.95 14847
1997 2540 2340 0.92 14622
1998 1934 1735 0.90 9299
1999 1746 1493 0.86 7695
2000 1539 1425 0.93 5324
2001 1723 1671 0.97 6369
2002 1993 1920 0.96 7361
2003 1802 1723 0.96 6088
2004 2657 2471 0.93 7963
Total 24910 23157 0.93 95932
Source: PGRLF (2005)
builds on earlier papers by Jaﬀee and Russell (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and others
to explain credit rationing and other imperfections as a rational, equilibrium-generating
response to adverse selection problems attributable to asymmetric information between
lenders and borrowers. Out of the classical papers dealing with credit contracts under
asymmetric information the papers by Bester (1985) and Besanko and Thakor (1987)
may be mentioned as relevant to the theoretical part of our paper. A comprehensive
recent treatment of these theories is provided by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) on a
general contract theory level, by Freixas and Rochet (1997) and Bebczuk (2003) in the
banking and ﬁnance environment context and by Cosci (1993) in a specialized setting
of the credit rationing problem. Gale (1990, 1991), Smith and Stutzer (1989) and more
recently Janda (2003, 2005) use this contract theory approach to analyze the government
interventions in credit markets.
42 The Government Support of Agriculture Through
SGAFF
The SGAFF was set up on the basis of a Czech government resolution in 1993 as a joint-
stock company whose sole shareholder is the Czech Ministry of Agriculture. The main
activity of the SGAFF is the provision of interest rate subsidies and loan guarantees. This
provision is done through a number of specialized programs targeted either to a particular
activity or to a particular type of recipients. More details about the creation and goals
of credit support is provided in articles by Horcicova (1993) and Horcicova and Vaskova
(1994). The evolution of the activities of SGAFF over the years of its operation is captured
in the Table 1. The term ”volume of mediated loans” used in this table means the total
size of all loans supported by SGAFF.
The very high approval ratio in the Table 1 is caused by the design of the SGAFF
activities. SGAFF never intended to serve as a screening institution which would evaluate
the quality of the submitted project and which would subsequently make a decision about
the accepting or rejecting the project based on it economic viability. The SGAFF as
a matter of its policy leaves the economic analysis of the business projects entirely on
the commercial banks. In the case the project is approved by the commercial bank for
ﬁnancing, the SGAFF essentially automatically provides the support for the project as
long as the project satisﬁes the generally given conditions and rules of SGAFF programs.
This means that the rejected applications for SGAFF support were those which somehow
violated these SGAFF rules. This policy explains the low administrative burden, simplicity
and transparency of SGAFF operations and the enthusiastic reception of SGAFF both by
farmers and bankers.
There are currently two groups of SGAFF main programs, investment and non-investment
loans programs, which are supplemented by the program Youth. This supplementary pro-
gram, which may be used by young farmers only in conjunction with some of the main
5Table 2: Appropriations to SGAFF from the state budget
Year —— 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Appropriation CZK billion 2.60 2.10 2.77 4.21 3.61 2.39 2.18 1.31 1.25 0.72 0.63 0.60
Change % ——- -19.2 31.9 52.0 -14.3 -33.8 -8.8 -39.9 -4.6 -42.4 -12.5 -4.8
Source: Czech State Budget Act (1994-2005)
programs, increases the rates of support provided under the main programs. The non-
investment loans support is currently represented only by the Interest Burden Compensa-
tion Program. The goal of this program is to compensate for the interest rate diﬀerence
between agricultural loans and the loans provided in other industries. The investment
group consists of 5 programs. Three of them are designed according to the production ver-
tical line as the Farmer, Processor, and Distribution Organization programs. The Hygiene
program is oriented on the improvement of veterinary and hygienic conditions of processing
animal and plan products according to EU and Czech regulations. The Land investment
program supports the land purchases for agricultural operations.
This description of the programs of SGAFF indicates, that the term Forestry in the
name of the SGAFF actually has no real meaning as far as the currently supported activities
are concerned. SGAFF supports only agriculture and the activities related to agriculture
now. In the past SGAFF also operated some programs related to non-production functions
of agriculture, to multifunctionality and rural development, and to the forestry.
3 The Budget Impact of SGAFF
3.1 The Funding of SGAFF
The funding for the SGAFF is based on two main sources - the shares portfolio and the
annual contribution from the state budget. At the time of its foundation the SGAFF was
endowed with the portfolio shares of agricultural or agriculture related enterprises. These
shares were obtained in two tranches. In 1994 the SGAFF obtained from the Fund of
National Property shares in nominal value CZK 3.8 billion coming from the ﬁrst wave of
6voucher privatization. Janda (1996) estimates the market value of this initial portfolio of
SGAFF to be in the range from minimum CZK 1.6 billion to maximum CZK 2.5 billion at
the time of creation of SGAFF. In 1995 the SGAFF received from the Fund of National
Property shares in nominal value CZK 1.865 billion coming from the second wave of voucher
privatization.At the time of their transfer to the SGAFF the market value of these shares
was again approximately one half of their nominal value. The SGAFF did not obtain the
shares completely for free. It had to pay for them one thousandth (1/1000) of their nominal
value, i.e. CZK 5.665 million. The initial portfolio of the SGAFF is described in more
detail by Janda (1994).
The most important source of SGAFF funding are the annual appropriations from the
state budget. The time series of these appropriations is provided in the Table 2. When
evaluating the dynamics of this time series, it should be kept in mind that the big upward
jump in 1997 is partly caused by the special appropriation of CZK 750 mil for the provision
of the ﬂood relief for the farmers in areas damaged by 1997 summer ﬂoods. The steady
decrease in annual government contributions which is especially pronounced since 2001
was partly connected with the decrease in the volume of support extended to farmers by
SGAFF, partly was caused by the argument, that SGAFF has suﬃcient capital, so it does
not need so high annual government contributions.
The comparison with the Table 1 shows that the period of high annual contributions
from the state budget from 1996 to 1998 corresponds to the period of the highest activity of
the fund in terms of volume of loans supported by SGAFF. While the volume of supported
loans in 2004 is approximately half as compared with the peak year of 1996, the share of
SGAFF in the total support of the Czech agriculture, shown in Table 3, decreased over
the years much more signiﬁcantly from 35 percent in 1994 to 3.5 percent in 2003.
7Table 3: Government Support to Agriculture
Type of expenditure 1994 1997 2000 2003
CZK mil % CZK mil % CZK mil % CZK mil %
SGAFF 2654 35.25 3458 28.18 2175 10.92 720 3.51
Market interventions 1925 25.56 2404 19.59 2420 12.15 6730 32.79
Direct subsidies 2139 28.41 3500 28.52 10848 54.45 7711 37.57
Research 448 5.95 418 3.41 441 2.21 586 2.85
Tax relief 264 3.51 1664 13.56 822 4.13 1597 7.78
Others 100 1.33 827 6.74 3217 16.15 3182 15.50
Total 7530 100.00 12271 100.00 19923 100.00 20526 100.00
Sources: The Report on the State of the Czech Agriculture (1995, 1998, 2001, 2004)
3.2 The Main Budget Costs of SGAFF
From the point of view of the Czech government, the budget cost of SGAFF are equal to
the annual contributions provided to SGAFF from the state budget through the Ministry
of Agriculture which are given in Table 2. From the economic point of view, these amounts
are just transfers from the state budget to the SGAFF budget. SGAFF is not obliged
to spend the funds provided by government in a given year for the credit support during
this year. From the logic of guarantees it follows that the guarantee institutions has to
keep enough funds to be able to cover due amounts over the whole duration of the loan.
Therefore the SGAFF has to have suﬃcient reserve funds available. According to PGRLF
(2005) p.15, the value of SGAFF portfolio reached CZK 6.5 billion by December 31, 2004.
Against these assets the future liabilities of the SGAFF have to be compared. According
to PGRLF (2005) p.17, as of December 31, 2004 the contracted guarantees associated
with loans outstanding were CZK 7239 million. At the same date, the total volume of
subsidies granted and associated with loans outstanding was CZK 5586 million, of which
approximately CZK 3849 million had been paid out already. To answer the question about
the quality of the match between the value of portfolio and future liabilities, the terms
structure of these liabilities and the expected rate of default ought to be known.
Unfortunately we do not have available data about current term structure of the future
liabilities of the SGAFF with respect to contracted future interest rates subsidies and
8Table 4: Supported Loans According to Their Duration
Loan Number Of which Loan Guarantees Subsidy Subsidies paid out
duration of approved amount amount in total by
applications December 31, 2004
(CZK million) (CZK million) (CZK million) (CZK million)
up to 1 yr. 7037 6989 32097 5476 2032 2028
up to 2 yrs. 2844 2825 9533 3399 1179 1101
up to 3 yrs. 1554 1536 3900 1168 682 678
up to 4 yrs. 4362 4327 13594 4201 3183 3108
up to 5 yrs. 1931 1898 6461 2056 1394 1176
up to 6 yrs. 3121 3064 13563 4816 3648 3127
up to 7 yrs. 1169 1165 6941 4032 2609 2319
up to 8 yrs. 656 642 5044 2851 2022 1758
up to 9 yrs. 119 117 1265 584 503 390
up to 10 yrs. 144 140 1855 899 800 559
up to 11 yrs. 16 16 257 173 164 124
up to 12 yrs. 6 6 64 43 57 42
up to 13 yrs. 3 3 22 0 12 10
up to 14 yrs. 6 6 23 4 11 2
up to 15 yrs. 18 18 107 18 49 12
up to 17 yrs. 1 1 20 0 14 4
up to 19 yrs. 5 5 7 0 4 0.02
up to 20 yrs. 18 18 43 0 22 0.38
Source: PGRLF(2005)
Note: Out of the 23157 loans approved by December 31, 2004 only 22776 are included in this table.
outstanding amounts of guarantees. But we have available the aggregated historical data
about duration structure of all loans supported by SGAFF since its foundation up to the
end of the year 2004. This information is provided in the Table 4. The duration data
in this table show that the majority of the supported loans is at most for two years.
When measured by loan amount, the one and two-years loans account for 44% of all loans
supported. Only very small share (5%) of the loan amount belongs to long term loans with
the duration of nine or more years. Therefore, based on historical data we could say that
the major expected cost and risk exposure of the SGAFF concentrates into a short term
horizon up to two years with the rest essentially distributed in the medium term of 3–8
years.
As we argued in previous paragraphs, the annual transfers from state budget to SGAFF
do not capture actual costs of SGAFF. It would be quite a complex problem to calculate
9Table 5: Guarantees and Subsidies Contracted and Paid
Year Guarantees Number Guarantee Subsidies Paid out from
contracted of defaults payments contracted the subsidies
by SGAFF contracted
(CZK million) (CZK million) (CZK million) (CZK million)
1994 1544 0 0 1259 286
1995 4436 9 28 2417 722
1996 8265 19 69 4337 1819
1997 4788 61 170 2964 2702
1998 2307 119 677 1959 2682
1999 1138 191 811 1394 2208
2000 876 181 723 754 1606
2001 1129 99 308 992 1333
2002 1365 60 109 1008 1267
2003 1714 36 131 606 964
2004 2306 40 176 763 880
total 29869 815 3201 18453 16469
Source: PGRLF(2005)
true economic costs of SGAFF if we would consider all direct and indirect costs. In
this paper we will restrict our attention just to the direct costs. Nevertheless even the
quantiﬁcation of all direct costs of SGAFF would not be easy task even if we had available
the internal accounting data of SGAFF. Since we do not have access to these proprietary
data, we focus just on the direct cost of the main activities of SGAFF in this paper.
As we already mentioned the principal activity of SGAFF is the support of agricultural
commercial loans through interest rates subsidies and guarantees. Therefore the main
budget costs of the SGAFF are the payments of interest rate subsidies and the guarantee
payments for defaulted loans. These payments are given in the Table 5 for the period from
1994 to 2004.
It may be seen from the Table 5 that both the total cost of guarantee payments and the
number of defaulted guaranteed loans were increasing with the sharp acceleration during
the period 1998–2000. The reaction to this trend was the steady decrease in the size of
contracted guarantees with the minimum achieved in in the year 2000. By comparing
the total guarantee payments with the total volume of guarantees contracted since the
beginning of SGAFF to the end of the year 2004, we ﬁnd out that the average share of
10paid guarantees with respect to the guarantees provided in the contracts over the years of
the operations of SGAFF was slightly higher than 10 percent. As long as we take these
historical data as a good prediction for expected future, we may expect that the cost of
CZK 7.239 billion guarantees outstanding as of December 31, 2004 will be around CZK
0.7 billion in the terms of expected actual guarantee payments by SGAFF. When we add
the CZK 1.737 billion of contracted interest rate subsidies outstanding, we see that the
CZK 6.5 billion value of the portfolio of SGAFF is suﬃciently high to support the major
mission of SGAFF no matter what are the operational institutional costs of running the
SGAFF operations and administration.
This comparison of the value of portfolio and expected cost of core activities of SGAFF
explains the reasons of decreasing government budget contributions presented in the Ta-
ble 2. It also explains the insistence of the Czech Ministry of Agriculture on the SGAFF
taking part in additional supporting activities in addition to its main mission of providing
credit guarantees and interest rate subsidies.
SGAFF obviously has also operational and administrative costs connected with its
functioning as an institution and the ﬁnancial costs of active management of its portfolio.
It also incurs signiﬁcant costs connected with a number of ad hoc activities imposed upon it
by its sole shareholder — the Czech Ministry of Agriculture. These ad hoc activities range
from the purchases of receivables to be received by primary agricultural producers from
processing ﬁrms during 1994–1999 to the ﬂood relief loans for 1997 and 2002 ﬂoods. The
most recent example is the involvement of SGAFF in the agricultural insurance support
since 2004. This support of agriculture insurance seems to be a lasting activity which could
become one of the major SGAFF lines of business.
While Czech Supreme Audit Oﬃce (1997, 1999) or Silar (1996) mentioned and criticized
a number of ineﬃciencies connected both with the main activities of SGAFF and all those
supplementary activities, we left all these legitimate concerns aside in this paper and
we restricted our attention just to the interest rates subsidies and guarantees payments
11summarized in the Table 5. We will continue to keep this concentration on guarantees
and interest rate subsidies in the following sections in which we switch our focus from the
empirical quantitative investigation to the theoretical qualitative mode of analysis.
4 The Model of Credit Rationing under Asymmetric
Information
In this section we incorporate the problem of budget costs of the government intervention
into the simpliﬁed version of the model of credit market under asymmetric information
developed by Janda (2003, 2005). This abridged model concentrates on ineﬃciencies caused
by credit rationing and therefore does not deal with eﬃciency losses caused by collateralized
debt contracts, which are analyzed by Janda (2003, 2005).
There are two types of risk neutral borrowers in this model, indexed as a type 1 and
a type 2. These two types are distinguished by their probability of successfully ﬁnishing
their project, denoted as 0 < δ1 < δ2 < 1, and by their reservation utilities, denoted as
b1 < b2. The probability that the random borrower facing lender is of a type 1 is θ.
The borrower can either undertake one risky project, which yields y in the case of a
success and 0 in the case of a failure, or he obtains the reservation utility bi, i ∈ {1,2}.
When the project is completed, the outcome of the project is freely observed by borrower,
lender, and government.
In order to undertake the project the borrower has to borrow one unit of money from
the lender. The unit cost of funds for risk neutral lenders engaged in Bertrand competition
is denoted as ρ. The contracts among lender and borrower are standard debt contracts.
This means that in the case of the success of the project the lender receives a constant
repayment R. Each lender oﬀers two types of contract. Each contract is a pair (πi,Ri),
i ∈ {1,2} where Ri is the required repayment and πi is the credit rationing probability,
12that is, the probability that the application of the borrower who chooses this contract will
be satisﬁed.
The expected utility of a borrower of type i who applies for a contract designed for a
borrower of a type j is given as incremental expected utility:
Uij = {πj[δi(y − Rj)] + (1 − πj)bi} − bi,
which may be simpliﬁed as
Uij = πj[δi(y − Rj) − bi]. (1)
This deﬁnition of utility function leads naturally to the participation constraint in the form
Uij ≥ 0.
We assume that each project is socially eﬃcient, that is δiy > bi + ρ. The only infor-
mational asymmetry in the model is that ex ante lenders and government do not know the
type of borrower.
The government may attempt to reduce the ineﬃciencies created by credit rationing
by three types of interventions, which were motivated by the programs used by the Czech
SGAFF.
Under the proportional guarantees program, the government guarantees the payment of
the fraction αi of the contracted loan repayment in the case of zero return from a project.
The expected proﬁt to a lender is
Bi = πi[δiRi + (1 − δi)αiRi − ρ]. (2)
Under the lump-sum guarantees program the government guarantees the payment of an
exogenously determined lump-sum gi in the case of zero return from project. The expected
proﬁt to a lender is
Bi = πi[δiRi + (1 − δi)gi − ρ]. (3)
13The last considered type of an intervention is an interest rate subsidy si, which is paid
only in the case of project’s success, as opposed to guarantees, which are paid in the case
of failure. While the subsidy reduces the interest rate paid by a borrower, we can treat it
analytically just like an exogenous supplement to a repayment to a lender. Therefore the
expected proﬁt to a lender is
Bi = πi[δi(Ri + si) − ρ]. (4)
In accord with the practice of the SGAFF, these supports are provided by the gov-
ernment for free. This means that the borrower does not have to pay any guarantee (or
subsidy) fee to the government, which is in the Czech reality represented by SGAFF. This
is in a sharp contrast with the usual commercially provided guarantees.
5 The Optimization Problem and Its Solution
Since the focus of our attention in this paper is on the budget costs of the government
intervention, we only brieﬂy state the solutions of the model under three diﬀerent con-
sidered interventions here. The detailed solution of the full unabridged model with the
relevant proofs is provided by Janda (2003, 2005). Those papers consider our three types
of government interventions but do not deal with their government budget impact, which
is the point of interest in this article. In this paper we will analyze only the situation when
the values of the reservation utilities and likelihood of success parameters are such that
b2
b1 ≥ δ2
δ1. This situation corresponds to the transition economy case in the terminology of
Janda (2003, 2005).
The lender under asymmetric information does not know ex ante the risk class of a
borrower. Because of the competition from other lenders, each lender attempts to oﬀer to
each type of the borrower as good conditions as possible. If the lump-sum guarantees are




!M = θU11 + (1 − θ)U22
= θπ1[δ1(y − R1) − b1] +
(1 − θ)π2[δ2(y − R2) − b2]
s.t.
π1[δ1(y − R1) − b1] ≥ π2[δ1(y − R2) − b1], (IC1)
π2[δ2(y − R2) − b2] ≥ π1[δ2(y − R1) − b2], (IC2)
Uii ≥ 0, (IRi)
0 ≤ πi ≤ 1,
δiRi + (1 − δi)gi − ρ = 0, (5)
i ∈ {1,2}.
Equation (5) is a zero proﬁt condition for lenders, which explicitly prohibits a cross-
subsidization. This means that it is not possible for lenders to suﬀer a loss on a contract
to one type of a borrower and to enjoy a positive proﬁt on a contract to another type
of a borrower. Zero proﬁt constraint puts a bound on the ability of lender to oﬀer the
most attractive contract to the borrower when the lender competes for him with the other
lenders.
When the proportional guarantees are used, the lender’s zero proﬁt condition (5) is
replaced by
δiRi + (1 − δi)αiRi − ρ = 0. (6)
When the interest rate subsidies are used the lender’s zero proﬁt condition (5) is replaced
by
15δi(Ri + si) − ρ = 0. (7)
By solving this optimization problem we ﬁnd out the following characteristics of the
optimal solution.
For the government support realized through lump-sum guarantees the contracts for
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δ1y − δ1




For the government support realized through proportional guarantees the contracts for
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δ1y − b1 −
δ1ρ
δ1+(1−δ1)α1




For the government support realized through interest rates subsidies the contracts for













δ1y − ρ − b1 + δ1s1
δ1y − δ1
δ2ρ − b1 + δ1s2
. (13)
16In the next section we will use these equilibrium values of the required repayments R∗
i
and credit rationing probabilities π∗
i, i ∈ {1,2}, to evaluate the budget cost of diﬀerent
types of interventions.
6 Budget Cost of Interventions
From the welfare point of view the absolute volume of the government money spent on
the interventions really does not matter as long as we take it as a pure transfer without
any transaction cost. We do not include into this model any formal considerations of the
cost of obtaining money for the the government budget neither do we model the cost of
transferring money from the government budget to the hands of lenders and borrowers.
This means that we do not answer the question if (taking into account the cost of obtain-
ing and transferring money) it is socially eﬃcient for the government to engage in credit
market interventions. In accord with actual situation of the Czech agricultural policies
and government decision making, we take it as a given fact that based on political reasons
the government decides to undertake a credit market intervention. Nevertheless we assume
that government would like to achieve its goals in the improving eﬃciency of credit markets
with as little government budget outlays as possible. (It is a very obvious assumption, but
it is not trivial. It could be possible that for some political economy reasons the govern-
ment would follow some additional goals besides improving the eﬃciency of credit markets
and those goals would not be compatible with the government budget cost minimization.)
Consequently, the government is very much interested in the expected budget impact of its
interventions, which is the subject of the following analysis. This means that we compare
here only relative eﬃciency (from the budget cost perspective) of diﬀerent credit market
interventions.
The expected budget cost of diﬀerent forms of government interventions Gm,m ∈

















1(1 − δ1)g1 + (1 − θ)π
∗




1δ1s1 + (1 − θ)π
∗
2δ2s2. (16)
Under the assumptions of our model in the ﬁrst-best full information case all the
projects would be realized. This means that asymmetric information leading to equilibrium
credit rationing generates welfare loss.
In the remainder of this section we consider the following scenario. We assume that
government determines the target level of credit rationing which the government would
like to achieve. To get to this target level government is able to use diﬀerent credit support
instruments.
Given a required target level of eﬃciency (determined by the level of π∗
2 ) denoted as
πh, we can determine the level of intervention m1(m2,πh), where m ∈ {α,g,s}, needed to
achieve this required target.
We will compute these levels of intervention and subsequently we will use them to
compare the budget impact of diﬀerent types of interventions under the condition of the
same achieved target level of eﬃciency.
For proportional guarantees we express from equation (11) the formula for a propor-
tional guarantee to a high risk borrower α1 as a function of the target level of credit
rationing πh and the proportional guarantee to a low risk borrower α2:
πh
"
δ1y − b1 −
δ1ρ
δ2 + (1 − δ2)α2
#
= δ1y − b1 −
δ1ρ








δ1y − b1 − πh
h






δ1y − b1 − πh
h




The size of a lump-sum guarantee for a high risk borrower g1, given as a function of the
targeted level of credit rationing πh and the lump-sum guarantee for a low risk borrower
g2, is obtained from equation (9) as:
g1(g2,πh) =
πh[δ1y − δ1
δ2ρ − b1 +
δ1(1−δ2)
δ2 g2] − δ1y + ρ + b1
1 − δ1
. (18)
Similarly, the interest rate subsidy for a high risk borrower, given as a function of πh
and s2, is obtained from equation (13) as:
s1(s2,πh) =
πh(δ1y − δ1
δ2ρ − b1 + δ1s2) − δ1y + ρ + b1
δ1
. (19)
The budget cost of a lump-sum guarantee intervention, given as a function of πh and
g2, are obtained by substituting g1(g2,πh) from (18) and π∗
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g2 + (1 − θ)πh(1 − δ2)g2.
The budget cost of an interest rate subsidy, given as a function of πh and s2, are
obtained by substituting π∗






ρ − b1 + δ1s2) − δ1y + ρ + b1
#










− δ1y + ρ + b1
)
+ θπhδ1s2 + (1 − θ)πhδ2s2.
The comparison of the budget cost for the targeted lump-sum guarantees and for the
targeted interest rate subsidies shows that:
Gs − Gg = πh
(
s2[θδ1 + (1 − θ)δ2] − g2[θ
δ1(1 − δ2)
δ2





δ2 + 1 − θ]





So, intuitively plausible, if s2 is suﬃciently high relative to g2, then Gs > Gg. This
means that if the government is targeting support both to low and high risk borrowers, the
comparison of budget impacts of lump-sum guarantees and interest rate subsidies depend
on the size of support provided directly to low risk borrowers. The intervention with lower
support targeted to low risk borrowers will be cheaper for the government budget.
For the optimal solution with s2 → 0, g2 → 0 we get lims2→0 Gs = limg2→0 Gg.













For the optimal interventions with negligible volume of support targeted to low risk
borrower the government is indiﬀerent among all three analyzed types of intervention as
far as the government budget impact of these interventions is concerned.
In the case of lump-sum guarantees and interest rate subsidies we can also easily express
g = g1 = g2 and s = s1 = s2:
g(πh) =
δ2[πh(δ1y − δ1
δ2ρ − b1) − (δ1y − ρ − b1)]




δ2ρ − b1) − (δ1y − ρ − b1)
δ1(1 − πh)
.
The comparison of the cost of non-targeted lump-sum guarantees and non-targeted
interest rate subsidies shows that:
Gs − Gg = [πh(δ1y −
δ1
δ2
ρ − b1) − (δ1y − ρ − b1)]·
[δ2(1 − δ1) − πhδ1(1 − δ2)][θδ1 + (1 − θ)δ2πh] − δ1δ2(1 − πh)[θ(1 − δ1) + (1 − θ)πh(1 − δ2)]




ρ − b1) − (δ1y − ρ − b1)]
(δ2 − δ1)πh[δ1θ + δ2(1 − θ)]
(1 − πh)[δ2(1 − δ1) − πhδ1(1 − δ2)]
.
20Since the denominator term (1 − πh)[δ2(1 − δ1) − πhδ1(1 − δ2)] may be shown to be
positive, the entire fraction is positive. The sign of the diﬀerence (Gs − Gg) therefore
depends on the leading term [πh(δ1y − δ1







. This fraction is equal to the size of credit rationing in the absence of
government intervention. Since in our model any meaningful intervention leads to the
decrease in the credit ration (meaning the increase in the πh), the leading term and the
whole expression will be positive. Therefore (Gs − Gg) > 0. This argument also conﬁrms
that the formulas for uniform interventions g(πh) and s(πh) derived in this section take
only positive values. The fact that the uniform interest rate subsidies are more expensive
than the uniform lump-sum guarantees means that that with the non-targeted supports,
the budget cost minimizing government in unambiguously prefers lump-sum guarantees to
interest rate subsidies.
Our theoretical results may be compared with the empirical evidence of the loan support
provided by the operations of the Czech SGAFF. The SGAFF started with heavy emphasize
on guarantee provision (as witnessed by its name which remains the same since the birth of
the SGAFF), when the rate of guarantees was quite high, in some cases up to 100 percent
of the contracted loan repayment. All the initial programs of SGAFF were providing
either only guarantees or guarantees and subsidies. There was no program providing only
interest rates subsides among the initial programs. The exception were only supplementary
programs (Landscape, Youth, and Agro-region), which were designed as supplementary
programs to by used by eligible farmers only in conjunction with some of the principal
programs. These supplementary programs provided additional interest rate subsidies.
After a few initial years both the rate of guarantees and the volume of provided guar-
antees decreased relative to the provision of the subsidies. This quantitative evidence of
a shift of emphasize to interest rates subsidies was quite consistent up to the year 2004.
The decrease in the provision of guarantees, which we discussed in the section 3.2, was
caused primarily by the increase in the guarantee payments from the SGAFF budget since
211998. Through the combined eﬀects of the decrease of the guarantees and better active
management of its portfolio of defaulted loans SGAFF managed to avoid a danger of mas-
sive default wave connected with the huge guarantee payments. Since the year 2001 the
guarantee payments of SGAFF decreased to the level prevailing before 1998. This created
a favorable environment for the revival of the credit guarantees as an major part in the
operations of the SGAFF. Therefore in the year 2004 a reversal of a trend of a decreasing
role of the guarantees happened towards the higher emphasize on guarantees, as measured
by their volume provided.
By the years 2004 and 2005 the guarantees provided by SGAFF are usually up to 30
percent of the contracted loan repayment, in some programs up to 50 percent. This means
that they are still set more conservatively than in the ﬁrst years of the SGAFF operations.
Up to 2004 non-investment loans were supported only by interest rates subsidies, currently
they are supported by both subsidies and guarantees. Among the investment loan pro-
grams, three of them provide for both interest rates subsidies and guarantees, one provides
only subsidies and one provides only subsidies in some investment areas and both subsidies
and guarantees in other investment areas.
7 Conclusions
In our paper we described the Czech institution of agricultural credit support SGAFF.
We showed the evolution of its activities, funding, and outlays over time. Our empirical
analysis shows that while both its absolute volumes and its relative importance in total
government support to agriculture decreased after the year 2000 as compared to second
half of nineties, it still remains as an important institution of agricultural credit support.
It is likely to remain active at current level at least up to the end of 2006. We have shown
that the value of the SGAFF portfolio is suﬃciently high to cover the expected costs of
credit guarantees and subsidies provided by the SGAFF so far.
22In the second half of this paper we augmented the empirical quantitative analysis by
a theoretical qualitative analysis. We started from the idea, that the government credit
support may decrease the ineﬃciencies caused by credit rationing based on incomplete
information of lenders about the quality of the farmers. We introduced the government
interventions - credit guarantees and interest rates subsidies - modeled according to their
Czech empirical counterparts. Our analysis was based on the comparison of direct budget
cost required by diﬀerent types of interventions for a given reduction of credit rationing.
Our analysis have shown that as long as the government is perfectly targeting its
interventions to the disadvantaged high risk farmers with the goal to reduce credit rationing
caused by asymmetric information, the considered types of interventions are perfectly
equivalent from the point of view of direct government budget cost. If the government
is targeting support both to low and high risk farmers then the comparison of lump-sum
guarantees and interest rates subsidies depends on the size of support provided to low risk
farmers. If the subsidy rates provided to these good farmers are suﬃciently high relative
to the lump-sum guarantees provided to these farmers, then the budget costs are higher
for subsidies. As long as the credit support is provided uniformly to all types of farmers,
the budget cost minimizing government unambiguously prefers lump-sum guarantees to
interest rate subsidies.
Our qualitative theoretical results have a mixed empirical evidence support. Since
the actually used guarantees and subsidies are uniform, our model predicts that the most
eﬃcient way for the government to decrease credit rationing is to prefer guarantees over
subsidies. This is what happened in the evolution of the Czech SGAFF fund during
the ﬁrst years of its operations and what seems to be happening again recently. In the
middle years of the evolution of the SGAFF the fear of the uncertainty connected with the
extended guarantees was stronger than our intuitively plausible theoretical argument and
the SGAFF curbed the provision of the guarantees. The successful management of the
guarantees and defaulted loans by the end of nineties and by the beginning of this century
23was probably the most important factor leading to the current renaissance of the SGAFF
credit guarantees.
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